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As has been repeatedly brought out in the last three chapters, the Philippine (P
government employed a wide variety of trade and payments measures as well tip
as fiscal and monetary policies to attract resources to the manufacturing sector to
and to assist agriculture. These included such devices as exchange controls, mi
protective tariffs, differential sales and compensating taxes, and exemptions
from the payment of both domestic taxes and taxes imposed on imported in- ifl(
puts.Although the over-all picture of special incentives provided to the in-
dustrial sector is obvious, it is difficult to gain a clear view of the magnitude 19
and relative differences among sectors in these incentives merely from an enu- en
meration of the various policies. The purpose of the present chapter, conse- pe
quently, is to analyze quantitatively the combined incentive effects of the dif- ye
ferent policies in terms of various pertinent measures, including effective en
exchange rates, implicit rates of protection, and effective protective rates.'
in
err
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES cal
One very useful measure of intersectoral differences in the incentives pro- we
vided by an industrialization program is the effective exchange rate (EER)
for various types of transactions, i.e., the number of units of local currency by
actually paid or received per dollar of a given international transaction. In
addition to taking account of the different exchange rates applicable to various is
typesof transactions, the EERs calculated here include the differential impact cat
on these transactions of tariffs, discriminatory sales or compensating taxes, an
84
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special foreign-exchange taxes, exemptions from various domestic taxes, sub-
sidized borrowing rates, and margin-deposit requirements on imports. What
the concept of EERs does not include, however, is any estimate of protective
effects over and above these measures that are caused by quantitative restric-
tions on the volume of foreign exchange available for a particular import.2
But, if both c.i.f. and domestic prices are available, the ratio of the domestic
price (net of normal distribution costs) of an imported commodity minus its
c.i.f. import price (in local currency) to the c.i.f. import price, i.e., the im-
plicit rate of protection, can be used to indicate the impact of either quanti-
tative restrictions or explicitly protective measures. This section contains in-
formation on EERs; the next section contains an analysis of the pattern of
implicit protection among exchange-control categories.
Tables 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 contain sets of EERs between 1949 and 1971
for various commodity groups classified according to their degree of essen-
tiality as determined by the exchange-control authorities (the Central Bank)
Table5-2 contains price-level-deflated effective exchange rate (PLD-EERs),
which are obtained by dividing the EERs in Table 5-1 by the Philippine whole-
sale price index. The exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power parity
me (PPP-EERs), shown in Table 5-3 are calculated, except for exports, by mul-
,ell tiplying the EERs in Table 5-1 by the ratio of the U.S. wholesale price index
tor to the Philippine wholesale price index. The export figures are estimated by
)ls, multiplying the export EERs in Table 5-1 by the ratio of the index of unit
)fl5 values (in dollars) for Philippine exports to the Philippine wholesale price
in- index.
in- Only from 1960 to November 1965 and again from February to May
ide 1970 were there differences in the nominal exchange rates applicable to differ-
• ent categories of commodities. These differences are summarized in the ap-
se- pendix to this chapter, together with the unified rates that applied in the other
Hf- years. Also specified in the appendix are the tariffs and other taxes or subsidies
ive employed in calculating the effective exchange rates shown in Table 5-1.
There is considerable variation in the number of commodities included
I in each of the exchange-control groups listed in the tables, and it must be
emphasized that the figures are presented as being typical of the commodity
categories rather than as actual averages for the groups. The tariffs and other
taxes used in calculating EERs for nonessential consumer goods are un-
ro- weighted averages for Valdepenas's 32-commodity sample of such goods.4
R) Between 1949 and 1961 the essential producer goods category is represented
icy by an unweighted average of Valdepenas's sample of 53 goods.5 From 1962
In on, however, the degree of protection on mechanical and electrical equipment
• is used to represent the category.6 Tax or subsidy rates for some of the other
lact categories are also based only on a few representative commodities. The tariff
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-92 MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1950—71
essential-consumer-goodsgroup and the rates for canned milk and antibiotics,
the essential-consumer-goods category.7 Nonessential producer goods are rep-
resented by loudspeakers; and semiessential producer goods, by aqua am-
1
monia.8 Producer goods used by "new and necessary" industries cover those t
producer goods that were exempted from paying import taxes throughout the
period.9 Finally, new exports cover those manufacturers who received tax- s
exempt treatment and loans at below-market interest charges, and the tradi- t
tional export group is represented by such agricultural exports as sugar, copra,
and coconut oil.
I:
The Structure of Effective Exchange Rates, 1949—71.
Aconsideration of the changes over the period in the differential incen-
tives provided for the local production of nonessential consumer goods, essen- I
tial consumer goods, producer goods used in "new and necessary" industries,
and new exports not only brings out the types of measures included in the esti- d
mates of EERs in Table 5-1 but also indicates the basic nature of Philippine 1
protectionist policies. Since there was a unified exchange rate in the Philip-
pines until 1960, differences in EERs among various types of transactions up
to that year are due only to differences in taxes or subsidies applicable to those
transactions. In 1949 and 1950, American goods still entered the Philippines
duty-free, and the sales or compensating tax was not yet discriminatory be-
tween imports and domestic production. The only barrier to importation was t
and 80 per cent margin-deposit requirement on luxury and nonessential items.
On the basis of a 12 per cent interest rate and an average three-month holding t
period for the deposit, this is equivalent to an additional import cost of 2.4
per cent. The EER for nonessential goods was, therefore 1.024 x P2.00 — I
P2.05per dollar. In Table 5-1 this rate is listed for nonessential consumer
goods, while the official rate of P2.00 per dollar is given for essential con- I
sumer goods and producer goods used in "new and necessary" industries. f
The EERs in Table 5-1 on new exports are to be interpreted as equal to s
the official rate plus the subsidy rate on annual sales for producers of these c
products. It is assumed that these firms could borrow from such government s
institutions as the Development Bank of the Philippines at 2 per cent below
the free-market rate. From 1949 through 1962, assistance to firms producing c
new exports consisted of exemption from a varying proportion of internal
taxes and duties on imports of capital goods, as well as easy financing terms
(see the appendix to this chapter for more details). In 1949 and 1950 the
combined tax and borrowing subsidy to producers of new exports was 12.2
per cent, a figure that yields an EER per dollar of P2.24 (=1.122xP2.00).
The pattern of a high degree of protection from import competition to ti
domestic producers of nonessential goods and a low degree of protection to a• EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES 93
I local producers of essential consumer goods and essential producer goods be-
gan to emerge by 1951. Tariffs were still not being imposed on U.S. imports
because of the preferences granted American goods, but the base of the sales
e tax on luxury items was changed to grant protection to local producers equiv-
alent to a 50 per cent duty. A slight degree of protection, 1.75 per cent, re-
suited from similar sales tax changes for essential consumer goods. In addi-
tion, the special 17 per cent excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was levied
in 1951, but with essential consumer goods and capital goods for "new and
necessary" industries being exempted from this tax. Thus, in addition to the
protective effects of the 80 per cent margin-deposit requirement (0.024 X
P2.00 =P0.05),the EER for imports of nonessential consumer goods ex-
ceeded the official figure of P2 per dollar both because of the discriminatory
sales tax (0.5 x P2.00 =P1.00)and the 17 per cent special excise tax on
foreign exchange sales (0.17 x P2.00 =P0.34).The combined impact of
these taxes is an EER of P2.00 + P0.05 + P1.00 + P0.34 =P3.39per U.S.
dollar. The EER for imports of essential consumer goods in 1951 was
1.0175 x P2.00 =P2.03per dollar. Since no import taxes were levied on
producer goods for new the EER for this group remained at P2.00
p per dollar. Imports of a dollar's worth of nonessential consumer goods, there-
;e fore, cost Philippine importers nearly 70 per cent more than a dollar's worth
of producer goods for new industries. Various tax exemptions and low-cost
borrowing privileges extended to firms producing new exports again amounted
Is to 12.2 per cent of sales and maintained an EER of P2.24 per dollar.
s. The protection provided local producers of nonessential goods continued
ig to rise throughout the 1950s for several reasons. Most important were the
4 gradual reduction in the degree of preferential treatment for U.S. goods and
= thesubstantial increase, in 1957, in tariffs on luxury goods. As these occurred,
additional protection was provided by the discriminatory sales tax, which was
based on the c.i.f.-plus-duty price of imports. The special 25 per cent margin
fee on foreign exchange was also introduced in 1959. On the other hand, es-
sential consumer goods were subject only to a rather modest tariff and a small
discriminatory sales tax, while essential producer goods for "new and neces-
at sary" industries were not subject even to those taxes.1°
w During the early part of the decontrol period, 1960 and 1961, the in-
ig crease in the cost of a dollar from 2 pesos to 3.0 pesos acted to raise the EER
al for nonessential consumer goods, whereas the gradual decline in the special
import tax (the replacement for the tax on foreign exchange) and in the mar-
gin fee operated to reduce it. On balance, however, this rate rose from P5.06
.2 per dollar in 1959 to P7.02 in 1961. In 1962, the decline in the margin fee
on foreign-exchange sales, from 15 per cent to zero, was more than offset by
Jto the additional depreciation of the peso to P3.90 per dollar, the rise in the
Ito average statutory duty level for the sample of goods in this category from 51
4
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percent to 83 per cent, the increase in the proportion of Philippine tariffs
applicable to American goods from 50 per cent to 75 per cent, and the intro-
duction of a special time-deposit requirement for imports. As a result, the
EER for nonessential consumer goods jumped to P10.04 per dollar. This rate s
increased somewhat further in 1965 when the share of Philippine duties ap-
plicable to U.S. goods rose from 75 per cent to 90 per cent, producing a t
stronger upward impact than the decline in the special import tax. Throughout e
the rest of the 1960s, variations in required margin deposits against imports
were the only cause of changes in the EER for nonessential consumer goods,
and did not significantly affect it. However, in 1970 the depreciation of the
peso to an average of nearly P6 per dollar again brought about a substantial
rise in the EER for nonessential consumer goods.
As is indicated in Table 5-1, until 1961, when the exchange rate for im- t
ports of essential consumer goods was increased above the traditional level e
of P2 per dollar, the EER for these goods rose only slightly, while the rate
on producer goods for new industries remained unchanged. Fixing the ex-
change rate at P3.90 per dollar, in mid-1962, acted to raise the EERs for
these two classes of imports significantly. Other forces influencing the level of
EERs in that year were a reduction in the statutory duty rates on many essen-
tial consumer goods, the rise in the proportion of tariff rates that were appli-
cable to imports from the United States (relevant only for essential consumer
goods, since imports of producer goods for new industries were exempt from
import duties), and the elimination of the margin fee on sales of foreign ex-
change (applicable only to producer goods for new industries, since essential
consumer goods were exempted from this charge). The net impact of these
factors was an increase in the EERs for essential consumer goods to P3.74
per dollar and for producer goods used in "new and necessary" industries to
P3.44 per dollar. The EER for essential goods again rose in 1963, but then
changed little until 1970. The rate for "new and necessary" industries re-
mained at P3.90 per dollar from 1962 to 1969.
The EEF. that applied to new exports increased in 1960 due to a rise in
the official exchange rate for new exports to P2.3 0 per dollar. This increase,
coupled with tax and interest subsidies, which declined somewhat from 1959,
brought about an increase in the effective rate for this category from P2.30
to P2.51 per dollar between 1959 and 1960. Through the mid-1960s, the main
factors affecting this rate were increases in the exchange rate applicable to
export transactions, first to P3.5 per dollar in 1962 and then to P3.90 per 9
dollarin 1965. The Investment Incentives Act of 1967 provided a slight in-
crease in the EER, but the major increase after 1965 occurred in 1970 with
the peso depreciation and the increase in export subsidies associated with the
Export Incentives Act of 1970. t
As is clearly brought out in Table 5-1, the Philippine government em-
4 . S 'EFFECTIVEEXCHANGE RATES 95
ployed exchange-rate, fiscal, and monetary policies to increase sharply the
peso costs of importing so-called nonessential consumer and producer goods.
te In the late 1940s and early 1950s nonessential consumer goods tended to con-
sist of items consumed only by the higher income groups, while nonessential
producer goods tended to comprise the raw materials and capital goods needed
a to produce these nonessential consumer goods. As the 1950s progressed, how-
it ever, these categories were used more and more to protect from import com-
petition those commodities that government officials decided could be pro-
duced domestically in acceptable quality and without incurring unreasonably
'te high costs. As noted in Chapter 2, one exchange-control category, namely,
unclassified items, consisted of commodities which in the opinion of govern-
ment officials were in adequate local supply and whose importation was,
therefore, virtually banned. Many items in the nonessential groups were given
el even greater protection by shifting them into this unclassified group.
te
TABLE 5-4
Relationships Among Effective Exchange Rates for
1- Various Exchange-Control Categories, 1950—70
Ratios of
Categoriesa 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
NEC to EC 1.02 1.80 3.12 2.78 2.72
SEC to EC 1.00 1.55 1.87 1.32 1.28
NEC to TX 1.02 1.84 3.14 3.06 3.43
SEC to TX 1.02 1.19 1.93 1.45 1.62
NEC to NX 0.92 1.59 2.78 2.80 2.70









SouRce: Table 5-1, above.
a. The abbreviations stand for the following exchange-control categories: NEC, non-
essential consumer goods; EC, essential consumer goods; SEC, semiessential consumer goods;
TX, traditional exports; and NX, new exports.
As is clearly expressed by the data in Table 5-4, between 1950 and 1960
the EERs among exchange-control categories changed in such a manner that
there was a strong incentive to shift resources from the production of essen-
tial items and export products to the production of nonessential and semi-
essential goods.11 The most important point to be made about the decontrol
efforts in the early 1960s and developments during the rest of the 1960s is
that they did not restore EERs for the various groups of imports to those ob-.
served prior to the exchange-control period. However, the incentives favoring96 MEASURESOF PROTECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1950—71
theproduction of nonessential and semiessential consumer goods relative to
essential consumer goods and exports were generally weaker in 1970 than
in 1960.
RealChangesin Effective Exchange Rates, 1949—71.
Theprice-level-deflated effective exchange rates (PLD-EERs) in Table
5-2 as well as the purchasing-power-parity-adjusted effective exchange rates f
(PPP-EERs) in Table 5-3 also bring out the protective aspects of Philippine
trade policy as well as the adverse effects of this policy on exporters. Except
for essential consumer goods and essential producer goods used in "new and
necessary" industries, the real peso cost of a dollar's worth of imports, i.e.,
the PLD-EER, increased substantially during the 1950s. For the sample of
nonessential consumer goods, the rise between 1949 and 1959 was 140 per
cent,12 while for essential consumer goods, the increase was only 5 per cent.
On the other hand, the domestic purchasing power of a dollar's worth of ex-
ports actually decreased 3 per cent between these years. Of course, these rela-
tionships ignore changes in world market prices. Using changes in U.S. whole- r
sale prices to indicate the international purchasing power of a dollar, the PPP-
EER (i.e., the EER multiplied by the ratio of U.S. wholesale prices to Philip-
pine wholesale prices) for imports of nonessential and essential consumer
goods increased by 190 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, between 1949
and 1959. As previously noted, in order to indicate changes in the quantity of
Philippine exports needed to earn a dollar, the unit value (in dollars) export
index of the Philippines is used rather than the U.S. wholesale price index.
The ratio of this price index to the Philippine wholesale price index multiplied
by the effective exchange rate for traditional exports, i.e., the PPP-EER, de-
creased 16 per cent between 1950 and 1959 (24 per cent between 1950 and
1956), indicating that the domestic purchasing power of exporters was con-
siderably poorer at the end of the decade than at the beginning.
The elimination of exchange controls reversed this downward trend in t
the purchasing-power position of exporters. For example, the PPP-EER for
traditional exports increased 44 per cent between 1959 and 1962. The impact
of the exchange-rate liberalization on producers of import substitutes cannot
be completely determined from Tables 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 because of the exist-
ence of quantitative import controls in 1959. However, wholesale prices of
such items as nonessential and unclassified consumer goods (see Table 5-6,
below) increased less than wholesale prices in general between 1959 and
1962, whereas the opposite is true of essential producer goods. Moreover, the ij
priceincrease in producer goods shown in Table 5-6 understates the actual
cost increase of these goods for producers who imported them directly, since
the 1959 wholesale price of producer goods shown in the table includes theEFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES 97
windfall gains associated with quantitative controls. Thus, the liberalization
measures shifted production incentives in favor of exporters and against pro-
ducers of manufactured consumer goods in the nonessential and unclassified
categories.
One important consequence of these shifts in incentives (which was dis-
cussed in Chapter 3) was the relative movement of resources into export pro-
e duction and out of food production. The result was a substantial increase in
food prices and therefore a significant rise in the wholesale price index for all
e items, especially between 1962 and 1965. Since nominal EERs increased for
all categories of import commodities as well as for exports between 1962
d and 1965, and U.S. wholesale prices rose only moderately, this significant
rise in Philippine wholesale prices caused the PPP-EER for several import
groups actually to decline between these years.
Between 1965 and 1969 the PPP-EERs for all import categories de-
L. dined, while those for exports did not change. The development efforts of the
Marcos administration as well as the election-related program of monetary
and fiscal ease of 1969 caused Philippine wholesale prices to rise somewhat
relative to U.S. wholesale prices and thus brought about a decline in the real
cost of imports. The ratio of the dollar price of Philippine exports to U.S.
wholesale prices did not change significantly. However, the floating of the peso
in early 1970 and its consequent depreciation sharply increased the PDL-EER
9 and PPP-EER for both imports and exports.
The main point that emerges from an overview of the more than twenty-
rt year period covered in Table 5-3 is the very significant increase in the real
costs of importing commodities, especially nonessential goods. By 1971, the
d PPP-EER for nonessential consumer goods was more than six times as high
as in 1949, while the PPP-EER for nonessential producer goods was over
d four times as high in 1971 as in 1949. On the other hand, the domestic pur-
chasing power of traditional exports was only 2.2 times as high in 1971 as in
1950. The widening of the gap between the real costs of importing nonessen-
n tials and the domestic purchasing power of traditional exports occurred during
the period of exchange controls in the 195 Os. For example, the ratio of the
PPP-EER for nonessential consumer goods to the PPP-EER for traditional
exports rose from 0.7 in 1950 to 2.3 in 1959. Even the disparity in 1959 un-
derestimates the ratio of the consumer costs of importing to the real rewards of
)f exporters, since importers were able to add on a scarcity windfall gain to their
5, import costs due to the existence of exchange controls. The 1960 level of 2.7
for this ratio more accurately reflects the true differential, since the exchange
rate on nonessentials was raised in that year to eliminate much of the windfall
gain accruing to importers. During the rest of the 1960s and into the early
1970s, the gap between real importing costs and real export rewards nar-
he rowed. The ratio of the PPP-EERs for nonessential consumer goods to tradi-98 MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN THE PHILIPPiNES, 1950—71
tional exports was only 2.2 in 1965 and 1.9 in 1971. However, the ratio is still
much higher than it had been during the immediate postwar period, indicating
the continued existence of a pattern of incentives strongly favoring import-
substituting investments in nonessential lines relative to the expansion of tradi-
tional (and even new) exports. —
C
IMPLICIT RATES OF PROTECTION S
S
Although EERs after 1962 provide a good indication of the relative incentives
made available to different types of manufacturing activity, as already noted,
such rates prior to that time underestimate the levels of protection because of F
the existence of exchange controls. What is needed for estimating incentive
effects of import controls when quantitative restrictions are binding is a corn- Noi
parison of domestic and import prices. Unfortunately, in the case of the Philip-
pines, unit-value import prices for individual commodities computed from the
most detailed import data available from the Central Bank vary so much over
time as to cast serious doubt on the validity of the quantity figures for particu- c
lar items. However, adequate c.i.f. and domestic comparisons for certain corn- c
modities do exist for the years 1950 and 1951 because special studies of this Aj
relationship were made by the government in connection with price control s4
efforts of that time. The implicit protective rates obtained from this data can
then be tied in with time-series information on price changes to indicate
changes in the pattern of implicit tariffs over time.
Table 5-5containsprice comparisons for a selected list of items as of
December 1951. As is indicated in the table, the range of implicit protection
was very wide, going from nearly 400 per cent to almost 700 per cent on such r
luxury items as oranges, cigarettes, and salt to quite moderate levels on evap- G
orated and condensed milk. On the other hand, as can be seen from Table
5-1, the protection afforded a given import bundle of nonessential consumer
goods by explicit fiscal and monetary measures in 1951 was only 70 per cent,
i.e. [(3.39/2.00) —1.001x The comparable figure for essential con- S
sumer goods was 2 per cent.
Domestic price behavior of the imported commodities included in the Unc
wholesale price index is shown in Table 5-6 on the basis of essentiality cate-
gories. As is indicated in the table, after the Korean War boom the government
permitted prices of both essential consumer goods and essential producer
goods to drop from their 1951 peak levels. But the high levels of the less essen-
tial consumer and producer goods were left unchanged. In a sense the govern- 4
mentwas able to use the temporarily high prices of the early 1 950s as an urn-
brella under which to carry out its discrimination among commodity groups
without
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SouRcE: Central Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report, 1951, p. 18.
a. In calculating implicit rates, 20 per cent of the c.i.f. impolt price is subtracted from the
retail price, since on most items, the price control authorities allowed this margin between
retail and import prices.
b. Unweighted averages.
c. This measure, which is peculiar to the Philippines, equals 3 liters.
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TABLE 5-6
Wholesale Price Indicesa for Imported Commodities




(EC) 128 107 125 183 208 214 322
Nonessential consumer
goods (NEC) 155 163 281 308 325 348 488
Unclassified consumer
goods(UC) 134 127 188 212 211 234 312
Essential producer goods
(EP) 160 136 156 188 197 205 257
Semiessential producer
goods (SEP) 130 132 201 222 241 252 328
Unclassified producer .
goods (UP) 173 106 142 158 165 160 183
SOURCE: CentralBank of the Philippines.
a. The 1970 essentiality cLassification of the Central Bank was used to divide the items
included in the wholesale price index into the various groups. The number of items used to
compute the simple means in each groupareas follows: EC—ll for 1951 and 1955 and 16
thereafter; NEC—26 items for 1951 and 1955 and 39 items thereafter; UC—6 items for 1951
and 1955 and 17 items thereafter; EP—16 items for the entire period; SEP—4 items for 1951
and 1955 and 15 items thereafter; UP—13 items for 1951 and 1955 and 26 items thereafter.
Semiessential goods andsemiunclassifiedproducergoodsare not included because the sample
size for these items was too small.
b. As of September.
After 1955, however, all prices again rose with the result that by 1959 prices
of essential goods were again at their 1951 levels. Prices of nonessential con-
sumer and producer goods continued to rise to new highs, with the degree of
discrimination between nonessential and essential consumer goods widening
from 56 in 1955 to 156 in 1959. Moreover, since the Central Bank's index of
c.i.f. import unit values for total imports actually declined about 2 per cent
between 1951 and 1959, it seems that the increases in wholesale prices of
imported goods in the Philippines between 1951 and 1959 reflect changes in
the degree of implicit protection rather than increases in c.i.f. costs.14
It is difficult to estimate average levels of implicit protection by exchange-
control groups because of the wide variations in the degree of protection
among commodities and the small size of the sample in Table 5-5. However,
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were not unusual for nonessential consumer goods. Since, as is indicated in
Table 5-6, prices of this group of items rose about 80 per cent between 1951
and 1959, levels of implicit protection of 400 per cent or more apparently ex-
isted at this time for some items.15 The protection from explicit fiscal measures
i onthis category of goods was 149 per cent, and this implies that windfall gains
of over 200 per cent were being made on these commodities.
970b Amore comprehensive estimate of the degree of protection of nonessen-
— datconsumer goods in 1959 can be made by working backward from the be-
322 havior of import prices and domestic wholesale prices for this category be-
tween 1959 and 1962, when import controls were completely dismantled. The
188 remarkable thing is that, whereas the peso cost, inclusive of all taxes, of a dol-
lar's worth of nonessential consumer goods rose by 98 per cent over this period
312 (Table 5-1) primarily as a result of the devaluation of the peso, the whole-
sale price index for these goods rose by only about 10 per cent (Table 5-6).
257 This disparity is indicative of the large windfall gains which had been accru-
328 ing to importers and traders in 1959 and which were eliminated with the free-
ing of imports from controls. In contrast to the explicit protection of 149 per
183 cent, i.e. [(5.06/2.03) —1.00]x 100, provided by fiscal and monetary meas-
— uresfor nonessential consumer goods in 1959 (Table 5-1), the implicit pro-
tective rate at that time can be calculated at about 361 per cent.16 Similar cal-
items culations for essential consumer goods and for essential producer goods give
implicit rates of protection in 1959 of 30 and 88 per cent, respectively.
1951 A third method of estimating levels of implicit protection in the 1950s
1951 is to compare wholesale prices of comparable items in the Philippines and the
after. United States. The results for a selected list of goods for which this compari-
•mpte son was possible are presented in Table 5-7. If it is assumed that costs of
shipping from U.S. wholesalers to Philippine wholesalers equals 25 per cent
Iofthe U.S. price, the protection on evaporated milk in 1959 amounts to 14
per cent, a figure comparable to that in Table 5_5•17Forsuch nonessential
rices consumer goods as canned cherries, canned asparagus, canned peaches, and
con- coffee, the implicit protective rates on the basis of the same kind of calculation
• of were 426, 374, 159, and 197 per cent, respectively, in 1959. On the other
fling hand, in the essential-producer-goods group, the 1959 protective rate on
of standard American newsprint was only 16 per cent; for sodium bichromate,
&
cent 31 per cent; and for blasting caps, 75 per cent.
• of It is clear from these three estimates that exchange controls added greatly
es in to the degree of protection provided by explicit fiscal and monetary measures.
In 1959, for example, implicit protective rates of 400 per cent were not un-
Lnge- common for nonessential consumer goods, whereas the average explicit de-
gree of protection in 1959 for this category was around 150 per cent. For the
1ever, essential-consumer-goods group, average implicit and explicit protective rates
'11951 in the same year were roughly 30 and 5 per cent, respectively.



























Selected U.S. Wholesale Prices and Wholesale Prices of Comparable
Imported Goods in the Philippines, 1949—65
(U.S.
Descriptionb 1949 1956 1959 1962 1965
Evaporated milk (EC), case of 48,
oz.tins
Philippines 7.20 7.96 9.28 7.47 8.08
United States — 6.00 6.52 6.07 6.31
Canned cherries (NEC), doz. cans
Philippines — — 12.00 7.14 7.66
United States — — 1.82 1.81 1.86
Canned peaches (NEC), doz. cans
Philippines — — 8.75 4.97 5.26
United States — — 2.70 2.42 3.07
Canned asparagus (NEC), doz. cans
Philippines — 10.62 13.88 8.10 8.74
United States — 2.41 2.34 2.50 2.62
Coffee (NEC), 1 lb. tin
Philippines — 2.34 2.64 1.41 1.44
United States — 1.00 0.71 0.64 0.80
Cocoa beans (NEP), lb.
Philippines 0.44 0.75 1.08 0.53 0.55
United States 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.21 0.21
Denim (UP), yd.
Philippines 0.44 0.52 0.60 0.40 0.51
United States 0.31 0,36 0.37 0.38 0.35




Sodium bichromate (EP), lb.
Philippines — 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.18
United States 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Potash muriate, basis K20
(EP), ton
Philippines - — 93.00106.00 64.00 86.00
United States 29.0023.00 20.00 23.00 24.00
Blasting caps, ordinary (EP), 1,000
Philippines — 32.00 48.0045.00 30.00
United States — 20.0022.00 23.0024.00
SOURCE: Philippine data from CentralBank of the Philippines; U.S.data from U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a. The conversion rate was 2 pesos to the dollar for 1946—59 and 3.90 pesos to the dollar
for 1962and 1965.
b.ECessential consumer goods; NEC =nonessential consumer goods;EP =essential
producer goods; NEP =nonessentialproducer goods; UP =unclassifiedproducer goods.EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 103
The relative protection afforded the different commodity categories re-
mained essentially the same between 1962 and 1969, since the ratio of non-
essential-consumer-goods prices to essential-consumer-goods prices and that
— ofessential-producer-goods prices to essential-consumer-goods prices in 1969
965 were 1.63 and 0.96, respectively, compared to 1.68 and 1.03 in 1962. Abso-
lute levels of implicit protection also did not change appreciably, as whole-
sale prices of imported goods increased in roughly the same proportion as im-
8.08 port unit values.
6.31 A comparison of the change in EERs and the change in wholesale prices
of imported goods between 1969 and 1970 suggests that some windfall gains
7.66 due to exchange controls may have existed in 1969, because wholesale prices
1.86 rose less than the peso prices of foreign commodities. This seems to hold par-
ticularly in the essential-producer-goods category for which, even assuming
no rise in c.i.f. prices, the peso cost of imports increased 50 per cent, whereas
the price, index rose only 25 per cent. However, an examination of the mdi-
8.74 vidual prices in this index reveals that many are reported as unchanged be-
2.62 tween 1969 and September 1970 (and some even since 1966). One suspects
that for many of these specialized capital goods, many wholesalers did not
1.44 sell any of these items between the time the exchange rate was depreciated, in
0.80 February 1970, and September 1970 and thus reported the price as unchanged
from its 1969 level. Simply removing items for which there was no price change
0.55 at all between 1969 and 1970 raises the price index in 1970 from 257 to 298
0.21 —a 45 per cent increase over the 1969 level. For other items, there probably
0 51 were sales by some wholesalers, but the price index for the item is still biased
0:35 downward because of the absence of sales by others.
58.00 EFFECTIVE PROTECTION
32.00
Some of the effective protective rates (EPRs) for the Philippines calculated by
0.18 John. Power are shown in Tables 5-8 and 5..918Power'sestimates include the
0.13 effects of the discriminatory sales or compensating tax'9 in addition to import
duties, but not the effects of the margin fee on foreign exchange, the special im-
36 00 port tax, or the margin requirements for letters of credit—measures that also
24.00 provided protection against imports in 1965.
Power points out that the negative effective rates for canned meat and
30.00 dairy products (Table 5-8) were obtained because of duty-free imports of
24.00 these items made in 1965 by the National Marketing Corporation, a govern-
ment organization whose function was to help maintain adequate supplies of
essential consumer goods at low prices. He is somewhat skeptical about the
accuracy of the negative rates for such manufactured items as stationery but
. suggeststhat production inefficiencies may be so extensive in some industries
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TABLE 5-8
Nominaland Effective Rates of Protection in Import-competing
















2024 Dairy products 1 —26
3832 Vehicle engines, parts, bodies 18 4
3621 Agricultural tractors 14 5
3622 Farm machinery, except tractors 16 5
3392 Lime 12 7
3632 Metal-forming machinery 12 8
3412 Iron and steel foundry products 10 7
3196 Agricultural chemicals 15 13
3111 Inorganic acids, alkali, chlorine 18 10
2056 Flour mill products • 15 12
3651 Industrial pumps and compressors 16 14
3192 Pharmaceutical preparations 25 22
3319 Structural clay products 19 21
3113 Compressed and liquified gases 24 25
3092 Processed rubber 27 23
3646 Woodworking machinery 15 27
3199 Inks and dyes 30 34
3211 Petroleum refinery products 13 42
3511 Packers' cans 25 49
3021 Tires and inner tubes 51 52
3591 Metal barrels, drums, etc. 40 59
3641 Rice-milling machinery 41 65
2712 Paper and paperboard products 31 59
3831 Trucks and buses 29 75
3321 Glass containers 45 81
3322 Flat glass and mirrors 44 77
3198 Polishing preparations 51 91




3734 Electric wires and wiring devices 20 103
3114 Fertilizers 16 72
3551 Wire nails, brads, and spikes 29 107
3992 Fabricated plastic products 74 156








































3923 Eyeglasses andspectacles • 98 165
3312 Clay tiles 102 243
3749 Sewing machines, household 78 318
3531 Structural iron and steel 81 335
3115 Plastic and resin materials 69 485
3732 Electric lamps 125 2,320
2641 Metal furniture 104 784










2316 Jute mill products 110 —3,154







ISIC =InternationalStandard Industrial Classification.
SouRce: John H. Power, "The Structure of Protection in the Philippines," in Bela
Balassa and associates, The StructureofProtection in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 275.
a. Nominal rates are weighted by output and effective rates by "derived" free-trade value
added.
The averages presented in Table 5-9 again confirm the disadvantageous
position of export producers compared to domestic producers of import-com-
peting manufactures. Power's 1965 estimates of EPRs are —19 per cent for
the former group and 59 per cent for the latter. EPRs for various export in-
dustries that I calculated for 1965 are as follows: veneer and plywood, —14
per cent; lumber, —11; coconut and copra, —6; abaca and other fibers, —12;
metallic mining, —16; and brewery and malt products,
A time series of EPRs by exchange-control categories, which is derived
from tariff data and input coefficients collected by Valdepeñas21 and also in-
cludes the effect of the other nontariff measures included in Table 5-1, is shown
in Table 5-10. The manner in which these were derived is explained in detail
in the appendix to this chapter. Briefly, the nominal protection (penalty or
subsidy in the case of exports) is taken to be the percentage by which the
EER in any year (Table 5-1)exceedsthe EER for producer goods used by
"new and necessary" industries in that year. Between 1949 and 1959, ther
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TABLE5-9
Average Rates of Protection"










All manufacturing 2 48
Except exports 28 71
SOURCE: Power, Protection in the Philippines, p. 278.
a. Nominal rates are weighted by output and effective rates by free-trade value added.
b. Non-import-competing industries are defined as those in which imports amount to less
than 10 per cent of domestic production.
lowest EER rate was generally the official rate of P2.00 to the dollar.22 Since
the EER equals the peso purchase price of a dollar's worth of goods rather
than the selling price of these goods—the latter figure exceeds the former if
imports are quantitatively restricted—the nominal protection on output is an
underestimate of the actual (implicit) level of protection during the period of
import controls from 1949 to 1960.
The calculation of EPRs over time highlights the biases previously
pointed out against the production of export commodities and essential goods
and in favor of nonessential goods. In 1961, for example, the effective protec-
tion afforded domestic producers of nonessential consumer goods relative to
producers of goods used by "new and necessary" industries was 230 per cent,
whereas it was 39 per cent for firms specializing in essential producer goods.
The unfavorable exchange rate for exporters together with the protection on
the imported inputs they used caused the EPR for traditional exports to be
significantly negative in that year. Moreover, the discrepancies in effective
protective rates remain very large even after the decontrol effort and through-
out the rest of the 1960s and early 1970s.
SMUGGLING AND OTHER MEANS
OF EVASION
Open smuggling has long been a serious problem in the Philippines because



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2SMUGGLINGAND OTHER MEANS OF EVASION 109
country is complete without a discussion of this subject. American cigarettes,
textiles, narcotics, and firearms appear to be the most important items smug-
gled into the country. In addition, a significant volume of copra and illegally
cut logs is exported without passing through proper channels. The value of
smuggled goods is, of course, very difficult to estimate. An estimate from the
government's Anti-Smuggling Action Center places the annual value of smug-
gled cigarettes at about $37 million in the 1962—65 period and $9 million from
1966 to 1969. Although estimates of the influx of other smuggled goods are
not available, the Anti-Smuggling Action Center does report the value of
confiscations of these other goods. If the ratio of the total volume of cigarettes
smuggled to the volume of cigarettes confiscated holds for these other goods,
the total value of smuggled goods, including cigarettes, comes to about $19
million in both 1966 and 1969, or around 2 per cent of total imports.
More important than pure smuggling is so-called technical smuggling.
This involves exporting or importing through regular ports but incorrectly
valuing, declaring, or classifying the commodities. Underinvoicing of exports
and overreporting of imports are well-recognized means of transferring funds
abroad. Similarly, declaring imports to be in commodity categories with lower
tariffs than those which actually apply and undervaluing imports are familiar
methods for avoiding the payment of import taxes.
A comparison by George Hicks of export and import values as reported
in Philippine statistics with exports and import values based on the statistics
of the country's major trading partners is reported in Table 5-11. On this evi-
dence, both exports and imports were generally undervalued during the 1950s
and 1960s, presumably because of the importance of smuggling and the un-
derinvoicing of both exports and imports. In the late 1950s it was estimated
by Central Bank authorities that the country was losing at least 10 per cent
of the annual dollar receipts from exports because of undervaluation and
misdeclaration of the latter.H Clearly, the overvaluation of the peso during this
period created a strong incentive for exporters to engage in these actions.24
The degree of export undervaluation decreases after the 1962 devaluation
(and is less than import undervaluation), consistent with the expected rela-
tionship between the exchange rate and the extent of underinvoicing of ex-
ports.
Undervaluation and misclassification of imports in categories where tar-
iffs are high or exchange controls tight have also been serious problems for
certain commodities. Textiles are the most frequently cited case. Ayal found,
for example, that in 1965 the value of imports of textiles from the United
States and from Japan as reported by the Central Bank was $6 and $9 million,
respectively. At the same time, exports of textiles to the Philippines from the
United States, as reported by the U.S. embassy, were $29 million and from
4 .. e•1
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TABLE 5-11
Official Philippine Exports and Imports as Percentages of Totals Estimated
from Statistics of Major Trading Partners, 1950—68
(computed from f.o.b. values in U.S. doElars)
Year Exports Imports Year Exports Imports
1950 101.7 n.a. 1960 93.6 93.8
1951 97.2 n.a. 1961 86.3 89.1
1952 98.1 n.a. 1962 90.2 95.3
1953 98.3 n.a. 1963 101.7 82.9
1954 94.4 99.1 1964 98.7 90.8
1955 92.5 101.7 1965 99.0 87.3
1956 91.3 92.9 1966 94.0 87.6
1957 85.2 92.3 1967 89.7 87.4
1958 102.8 98.2 1968 91.5 89.0
1959 100.1 91.4
n.a. =notavailable.
SOURCE: George L. Hicks, "Philippine Foreign Trade, 1950—1965: Basic Data and Major
Characteristics" and "Philippine Foreign Trade Statistics: Supplementary Data and Interpre-
tations, 1954—1966" (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, Center for Develop-
ment Planning, 1967; mimeo.), except for 1966—68 which are from George L. Hicks and
Geoffrey McNicoll, Trade and Growth in the Philippines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1971), p. 46.
Japan, as reported by the Japanese government, were $36 million.25 A similar
extensive degree of undervaluation also existed in 1966.
To test the hypothesis that the degree of import undervaluation is posi-
tively related to the height of duty levied on an item, a comparison was made
of 1967 f.o.b. import values, supplied by the Philippine Central Bank, and
f.o.b. export values of the same items, from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, for a sample of 62 commodities. The resulting regression equation was
y =—1.65+ 14.70x, where y =ratioof U.S. data on U.S. exports to the
Philippines to Philippine data on Philippine imports from the United States,
and x =1969ad valorem percentage tariff rates in the Philippines. The t
value for the coefficient of x is 4.27, which is significant at the 1 per cent level,
and the coefficient of correlation (r)is0.48. Thus, the hypothesis that the
higher the tariff the greater the degree of undervaluation is supported by the
statistical analysis. Moreover, the degree of undervaluation increases very
sharply as the duty rises.
In addition to commodities being imported without the payment of im-
port taxes because of open or technical smuggling, many dutiable items are
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tal goods in industries registered with the Board of Investment have already
been mentioned in Chapter 3. Exemptions of this sort are deliberately designed
to foster growth in high-priority industries. Other sectors, organizations, or
items that are specifically exempted from certain import taxes for reasons of
growth, employment, or equity include fertilizer manufacturers, the textile
industry, the petroleum industry, private development banks, agricultural co-
operatives, cottage industries, government entities, the National Power Cor-
poration, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine
National Railways, Philippine Airlines, various electric authorities, the Philip-
pine Virginia Tobacco Association, the Rice and Corn Administration, the
National Marketing Authority, personal effects of foreign residents, and
donations from abroad to local charitable, religious, and civic organizations.
As the customs commissioner has pointed out, goods normally taxed that are
imported under special tax-exemption laws frequently are not used for the
purpose for which the exemption is granted but, instead, find their way into
regular market channels.2°
As long as some import flows continue through proper channels, do-
mestic prices will be unaffected by the various measures described above to
icr avoid import taxes.27 Rather than being hurt by a decrease in protection, do-
mestic producers are adversely affected mainly through a loss of markets
nd because of these various illegal activities. However, there also are many duti-
able items in the Philippine import statistics on which no import duties are
collected because of legal exemptions. In these cases not only do domestic
producers lose markets to smugglers and others who illegally channel goods
ar into commercial markets, but also the price of the product is depressed by
these activities. The height of the tariff and other taxes on imports then incor-
Si- rectly measures the protection given local producers. How important this
de point is for measuring the general contours of Philippine protectionism is not
nd known.
fl- Another important effect of an overvalued exchange rate is to increase the
•as use of imported capital goods by local producers. Since capital goods imports
he are favored by exchange authorities, importers find that it is easy to make
windfall gains by transferring funds abroad through overinvoiced purchases
of these items. The highly specialized nature of most of these items makes
el, overinvoicing hard to detect, and the ability to borrow at below-market in-
he terest rates makes this activity doubly attractive. In a scenario common in the
he Philippines, high protection plus subsidized loans and guarantees are pro-
ry vided for a potential import-competing activity; later, it is discovered that the
high duty encourages so much smuggling of various sorts that the market left
is too small to take advantage of all the economies of scale. Excess capacity
develops because the capital goods are purchased in expectation of a larger
market than in fact materializes. In addition, some producer-importers appar-
4
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ently have no intention of trying to run a successful business. Instead, they ar- ii!
range with foreign exporters to overreport the value of their capital goods im-
ports and thereby transfer some of the borrowed funds to accounts abroad. K
Theyare unable to repay the funds borrowed from such organizations as the fl
Development Bank of the Philippines, but still end up with the funds trans- P
ferred abroad as a gain. However, inflated capital-output ratios and excess
capacity are the price that the country as a whole pays.28 W
SUMMARY
S
All the measures of protection analyzed in this chapter bring out essentially
the same story. Beginning in 1950 and 1951 the Philippine government un- I,
dertook a policy of sharply curtailing imports of consumption goods in order
to favor the importation of the raw materials and capital goods needed for
industrial development. This is very apparent from the behavior of the various
EERs as well as the EPRs, all of which indicate a sharp increase in the pro- d,
tection of nonessential goods relative to essential goods and exports in 1951.
The import-cutback program coupled with the economic prosperity associ-
ated with the Korean War caused the implicit protection on essential con-
sumption goods to rise more than the government wished, but by 1953 the
government seemed to have mastered the technique of providing high pro-
tection to nonessential goods while still permitting liberal imports of essential
consumer and producer goods. b
For the rest of the 1950s, beginning with 1953, when the Central Bank
became the sole manager of the system of import and exchange controls, the
protection and subsidization provided to domestic industries producing non-
essential consumer and producer goods continued to widen relative to the tal
production of essential commodities and export products. Protective rates for
a number of nonessential consumer goods seem to have doubled during the
195 Os. Of particular significance is that the domestic purchasing power of a c
given quantity of exports declined steadily in those years.
The dismantling of the exchange-control system during the early 1960s
did not represent a significant liberalization in the sense of sharply reducing
the differences in production incentives among the various import sectors. For
example, in 1963, the real effective exchange rate, i.e., the PPP-EER, of im-
ported nonessential consumer items was 2.65 times as large as that for im-
ported essential consumer goods, and the PPP-EER for nonessential pro-
ducer goods was 1.52 times as large as that for essential producer goods. These
figures are higher than the same ratios in 1959, although the 1959 figures do
not include any scarcity premiums due to exchange controls. The gap inCALCULATING EERS AND ERPS 113
incentives between traditional exports and import-competing sectors also re-
mained high.
From 1963 through 1969 the relative protection between essential and
nonessential consumer goods as well as between essential and nonessential
producer goods remained the same. However, the real cost of imports in abso-
lute terms declined somewhat between 1963 and 1969. Nevertheless, this cost
was still between 1.7 and 5.0 times larger than in 1949. One encouraging
development after 1963 was the shift in incentives in favor of firms producing
new exports. Between 1963 and 1969 the PPP-EER for new exports increased
in contrast to the general decline for import transactions. However, this rate
still remained low compared to those in the import-competing sectors.
The 1970 exchange crisis brought about further substantial increases in
both nominal and real effective exchange rates. These rates declined somewhat
in 1971 but were still at record heights. To sustain an economic expansion by
foreign borrowing, much of it of a short-term, limited nature, it was eventually
necessary to raise the real domestic costs of importing and again to shift pro-
duction incentives in favor of exporters.
1.
APPENDIX: CALCULATING EFFECTIVE
EXCHANGE RATES AND EFFECTIVE
ie RATES OF PROTECTION
Data Used in Calculating Effective Exchange Rates,
tk
by Exchange-Control Category, 1949—71.
ie EXCHANGE RATES
1- TheEER for a particular exchange-control category and year is ob-
ie tamed by increasing (decreasing) the applicable official exchange rate by the
various trade taxes (subsidies) that must be paid on transactions of this type.
ie The exchange rates (in terms of number of pesos per U.S. dollar) used in the
a calculations are as follows:
1949—59—P2.00 for all groups;
1960—essential consumer goods and essential producer goods, including
or those for "new and necessary" industries, P2.08; semiessential producer
goods, P2.10; traditional and new exports, P2.22; nonessential consumer
goods, semiessential consumer goods, and nonessential producer goods,
P2.83;
se 1961—essential consumer goods and essential producer goods, including
those for "new and necessary" industries, P2.92; semiessential producer
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goods, and nonessential producer goods, P3.0; traditional and new cx- 19
ports,P2.68; 19
1962—all groups except traditional and new exports, P3.44; traditional
and new exports, P3.15;
1963—69—all groups except traditional exports and new exports, P3.90;
1963—64—traditional and new exports, P3.52; bas
1965—69—traditional and new exports, P3.90; co
1970—all groups except traditional exports, P5.89; traditional exports dut
(taking account of the 80-20 split between the old and new exchange eff
rate), P5.57;




From 1946 to 1955, when a free-trade arrangement was in effect be- dis
tween the United States and the Philippines, no duty is included. From 1956
to 1971, the nominal duty levels in the Philippines were multiplied by the fol- No
lowing percentages in order to reflect the increasing proportion of the nominal se
duty that was applicable against U.S. goods: 1956—58, 25 per cent; 1959—61, du
50 per cent; 1962—64, 75 per cent; 1965—73, 90 per cent. The nominal tariff 19
rates used for the various categories are shown in the accompanying table. va
uat
1956 195 761 196271 folli
Consumer goods tiall
Nonessential 18% 51 % 83%
Semiessential 35 40 40 prof
Essential 15 12 9
Producer goods
Nonessential 20 25 100
Semiessential 15 22 29
Essential 22 22 25
im
Producer goods for "new and necessary industries"—same
as for essential producer goods.
EXCISE TAXANDMARGIN FEE ON SALE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE wa
For all groups except essential consumer goods and producer goods for suc
new industries (both of which were exempted from these charges): 1951—54, ket
17 per cent; 1955—58, zero; 1959, 25 per cent; 1960, 24 per cent; 1961, 16 4 p
per cent; 1962—71, zero. the
SPECIAL IMPORT TAX An'
For 1949—54, zero; 1955—56, 17 per cent; 1957, 15.3 per cent; 1958, for
13.6 per cent; 1959, 11.9 per cent; 1960, 10.2 per cent; 1961, 8.5 per cent; the
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1962, 6.8 per cent; 1963, 5.1 per cent; 1964, 3.4 per cent; 1965, 1.7 per cent;
1966—71,zero.(Exemptions are the same as above.)
PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF SALES OR COMPENSATING TA.x
Thediscriminatory aspect of the sales tax on imports arises because the
base on which the tax is levied is greater than that for domestically produced
commodities and also because the sales tax was levied not only on the import
ts duty, but also on the special import tax in effect from 195 5—65. The protective
effect of the sales tax was determined by multiplying the sales tax rate by the
sum of 1 plus the special import tax rate plus the tariff rate on U.S. imports,
and then multiplying this product by the sum of 1 plus the rate by which the
import valuation base exceeded the valuation base for comparable domestic
goods. The sales tax rate was then deducted from this result to obtain the net
e- discriminatory effect.
The sales tax rates for the various commodity groups are as follows.
Nonessential consumer goods: 1949, 30 per cent; 1950—71, 50 per cent;
al semiessential consumer goods, essential consumer goods, nonessential pro-
ducer goods, semiessential producer goods, and essential producer goods:
jff 1949—50, zero; 195 1—71, 7 per cent. The special import tax rate and the rele-
.e. vant tariff rates have already been given in this appendix. The size of the val-
uation base for imports as compared to domestically produced goods is as
follows: nonessential consumer goods—1949—50, 1; 195 1—71, 2; semiessen-
tial and essential consumer goods—1949—50, 1; 195 1—71, 1.25; nonessential
and semiessential producer goods—1949—50, 1;1951—71, 1.25; essential
• producer goods—1949—50, 1; 195 1—71, 1.25; essential producer goods for
"new and necessary" industries—i 949—71, exempt from the tax.
MARGIN-DEPOSIT REQUIREMENTS
Estimates of the protective effect of the various margin requirements for
importing are shown in Table 5-12.
SUBSIDY ON NEW EXPORTS
In estimating the net subsidy for producing new export commodities, it
was assumed that such industries could borrow from government organizations
or such as the Development Bank of the Philippines at 2 per cent below the mar-
4, ket rate. Assuming an incremental capital-output ratio of 2, this implies a
16 4 per cent subsidy on output. For the 1949—62 period, the subsidy effect of
the various tax exemptions for these industries was taken from a study by the
Philippine Chamber of Commerce, reported in Official Proceedings, Fifth
Annual Convention of Manufacturers and Producers, Volume VIII, 1958;
for the period thereafter, it was estimated from a sample of firms analyzed by



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0cent; 1953—58, 12.1 per cent; 1959, 10.9 per cent; 1960, 9.1 per cent; 1961,
6.1 per cent; 1962, 3 per cent; 1963—66, 2 per cent; 1967—69, 3 per cent;
1970—71, 7 per cent.
TAX ON TRADITIONAL EXPORTS
An export tax of 10 per cent was levied on traditional exports beginning
in May 1970. The tax was continued in 1971.
Calculation of Effective Rates of Protection
by Exchange-Control Category, 1949—71.
The commodities included in each group are the same as those included
in the estimates of EERs by exchange-control category. The protection (pen-
alty or subsidy in the case of exports) on the output of a particular import
category for a specific year is equal to the percentage by which the EER in
that category exceeds the EER for producer goods used by "new and neces-
sary" industries in that year. The protection on inputs for all categories ex-
cept semiessential producer goods after 1956, producer goods for "new and
necessary" industries, and new exports is assumed to equal the degree of pro-
tection on essential producer goods. For semiessential producer goods after
1956, the protective rate on inputs is the same as the protective rate on essen-
tial producer goods except for the tariff component of this protection. For
1962—71 the duty component is the duty on inputs into aqua ammonia as re-
ported by Valdepenas,29 namely, 4.4 per cent. For 1957—61, 3.9 per cent is
used as the duty component of the protective rate on inputs.
The protection on inputs used in "new and necessary" industries and for
new exports is assumed to be zero.
The formula for the effective rate of protection is
—
1—
wheret, is the tariff rate on any output,is the tariff rate on any output used
as an input in the production of the /th output, and a15 is the value of the ith
output used to produce a unit value of the jth output at free-trade prices. The
various a1, coefficients also are based on data from Valdepeñas.3° His tariff-
inclusiveare corrected to obtain free-trade aj5s and then combined to ob-
tain unweighted averages of these coefficients for the appropriate categories.
The averages are as follows: nonessential consumer goods, 0.47; semiessen-
tial consumer goods, 0.39; essential consumer goods, 0.35; nonessential pro-
ducer goods, 0.56; semiessential producer goods, 0.19; essential producer
goods, 0.50; producer goods for "new and necessary" industries, 0.50; tradi-
tional exports, 0.44; new exports, 0.48.
7
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1. Estimates of domestic resource costs—which is a measure of the value of do- be
mestic resources (at opportunity cost prices) employed in earning or saving a dollar of dth
foreign exchange (in the value-added sense) when a good is produced domestically— imj
are not included in this study, although such estimates were made for other country the
studies in the series of which this study is a part. Underlying Philippine data did not a
seem sufficiently extensive or accurate to warrant including these DRC estimates. cen
2. See Appendix A for definitions of the various concepts employed in the project the
of which this study is a part. a di
3. Since imports from the United States were so significant, especially during the
years when tariff preferences were substantial, the tariff rates used in calculating effective tan
exchange rates in these tables are those applicable to imports from the United States, per
i.e., they take account of the tariff preferences extended to American goods. In 1950, for P2.
example, imports from the United States amounted to 75 per cent of all Philippine im- all
ports. This percentage had fallen to 42 per cent by 1960 and 29 per cent by 1970. per
4. See Vicente B. Valdepeñas, Jr., The Protection and Development of Philippine per
Manufacturing (Manila: Ateneo University Press, 1970), Table 6.1, pp. 82—85, for a per
listing of these commodities. sub
5. See bc. cit. for a listing of these commodities. X 1
6. Valdepelias's choice of sample was influenced by his objective of obtaining de-
tailed information on duties for inputs used in producing various goods. He was able
to obtain such information from confidential files of the Tariff Commission that were the
assembled in response to requests for tariff changes after the devaluation of 1962. Since
requests and studies for tariff changes tend to occur for items for which there is an for
above-average chance of a tariff increase, Valdepeflas's sample tends to exaggerate the mdi
tariff increases classified by essentiality categories after 1962. This is confirmed by an
analysis of all tariff changes between 1957 and 1970 classified by standard commod- gro
ity groups. This upward bias could be especially misleading in the essential-producer-
goods class, and a more representative item was therefore picked for the post-1962 pe- 011
nod. The upward bias is also present,it should be noted, in the nonessential goods 195
category (where a correction is not made for the post-1962 period), but it appears that
duties were in fact raised on a larger proportion of all items in this group than on the imp
essential-producer-goods group. dec
7. Two difficulties with tracing EERs over time are the shift of items from one
exchange-control category to another and the establishment of new categories. Thermos WO!
bottles, for example, are included among the 32 items in Valdepenas's list of nonessential
consumer goods, which is based on the 1953 classification of imports by the Ceneral Bank. 195
When the semiessential category was created, in 1957, this item was transferred out of them
the nonessential-consumer-goods class. Cost
8. Loudspeakers were also classified as a nonessential consumer good, and aqua its1
ammonia as a nonessential producer good, in the 1953 classification system. 308
9. The list of goods in this category narrowed over time as more producer goods
were produced locally with the aid of a high degree of protection. mea
10. The 1959 EERs for the types of goods mentioned in this paragraph were corn- (c)
puted as follows. The average tariff for the sample of goods included in the nonessential- and
consumer-goods group was 51 per cent in 1959. Since U.S. goods were subject to only of 1
50 per cent of the duty in that year, the cost-increasing effect of the tariff was 0.5 x0.51 61,
xP2.00=P0.51. The 25 per cent margin fee and the special import tax, which had ternNOTES 119
decreasedto 11.9 per cent, added P0.74, i.e. (0.25 + 0.119) xP2.00,to the official peso
cost of a dollar's worth of goods. The sales tax further increased the cost of importing,
since, as noted in the appendix to this chapter, it was required that the 50 per cent tax
be levied on twice the cost of imports. Whereas the sales tax on a domestically pro-
0- ducednonessential consumer good costing 2 pesos was 1 peso, the tax on a comparable
of imported good was 0.5 x(1.000+ 0.374) xP2.00x2.0=P2.748,or P1.748 more than
— thedomestic good. Finally, the required margin deposit of 100 per cent (assumed to be for
a three-month period and at a forgone annual interest rate of 12 per cent) added 3 per
tot cent, or 0.03 xP2.00=P0.06to the official cost of a dollar's worth of imports. In total,
these measures added P3.06 (0.51 + 0.74 + 1.75 + 0.06) to the official P2.00 cost of
sct a dollar and brought the EER to P5.06 per dollar for nonessential consumer goods. Im-
ports of essential consumer goods, on the other hand, were impaired only by a modest
tariff (6 per cent) and a 2.3 per cent discriminatory effect from the sales tax. The EER
ye per dollar for this category of imports was, therefore (0.06 + 0.023) xP2.00+ P2.00 =
eS, P2.17. Imports of producer goods for "new and necessary" industries were exempt from
or all charges except the margin.deposit requirement, and the EER in 1959 was P2.03
m- per dollar. The value of the internal tax exemptions for new export industries was 10.9
per cent in that year, and the interest subsidy on output was assumed to remain at 4
ne percent throughout the period (see the appendix to this chapter). This 14.9 per cent
a subsidy on sales yields a figure of P2.30 per dollar for the EER for new exports, i.e., 1.149
xP2.00.
Se- 11. The actual shifts in the structure of production are analyzed in the next chapter.
ble 12. Again, it should be noted that this figure is an underestimate of the increase in
the market cost of imports because of the existence of exchange controls in 1959.
ce 13. The explicit rate of protection is taken to be the percentage by which the EER
for a particular category exceeds the EER for producer goods for "new and necessary"
the industries.
an 14. The Central Bank stopped publishing import unit values by detailed commodity
groups after 1955.
er- IS. Let x be the 1951 c.i.f, prices of nonessential goods, 2x the implicit protection
me- on these goods, and 3.Ox the 1951 domestic price. Since this price increased 0.8 between
)ds 1951 and 1959, the 1959 price is 5.4x.Dividingthis by x, the 1959 c.i.f. price, gives 5.4
hat or 440 per cent [(5.4 —1.0)x1001as the rate of protection in 1959. Changes in c.i.f.
the import unit values are not taken into account in the calculation, since this index actually
declined slightly between 1951 and 1959.
)ne 16. The steps in the calculation are as follows:(a) The peso cost of a dollar's
worth of nonessential consumer goods in 1962 was 1.98 times as large as in 1959, i.e.,
tial 10.04/5.06, whereas the import unit value (in dollars) index in 1962 was 1.04 times its
nk. 1959 level. The peso cost of a given bundle of nonessential consumer goods in 1962 was,
therefore, 1.98 x1.042.06 times its 1959 cost. Put the other way around, the peso
cost of a given bundle of nonessential consumer goods in 1959 was 1.00/2.06 or 0.49 of
qua its 1962 level. (b) Since the wholesale price index for nonessential consumer goods was
308 in 1962 (Table 5-6) when there were no exchange controls and thus no windfall
ods profits, the cost of these goods in 1959 including the effects of all fiscal and monetary
measures and expressed in terms of the wholesale price index was 151, i.e., 0.49 x308.
)m- (c) Thus, the c.i.f. cost of these goods in 1959 equaled 151 less the effects of the fiscal
and monetary measures. Since the effects of these measures provided a protective rate
of 149 per cent, the c.i.f. import cost expressed in terms of the wholesale price index was
b.Sl 61, i.e., letting x be the c.i.f. import cost, 1.49x + x =151.(d) Because the cost in
terms of the wholesale price index was 61 in 1959 while the actual wholesale price index
LL ..,i¶
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in 1959 was 281 (Table 5-6), the level of implicit protection in that year was [(281/61)
—1]X 100 =361per cent. C
17.This figure would be the implicit rate in 1959 because the wholesale price of the
product was the same in 1959 as in 1951.
K
18.John H. Power, "The Structure of Protection in the Philippines," in Bela Balassa
and associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 271—280. Input-output data for the manufacturing sector were
obtained by Power from the 1965 Survey of Manufactures, made available by the E PhilippineBureau of Census and Statistics, whereas input-output data for nonmanufac-
turing sectors were based on the Philippine Census of Manufactures for 1961.
19. It appears, however, that Power's correction for the discriminatory effect of
the sales tax is excessive. He compares the tax levied on the marked-up value of imports
with the tax levied domestically on "the portion of the manufacturer's price that repre-
sents inputs not already taxed (for the most part, value-added plus electricity, fuel, and
depreciation)" (Power, "Protection in the Philippines," p. 271). While it is true that a
particular domestic manufacturer pays on this base, the prices of previously taxed inputs
are already inflated, and they cut into the protection on value added. His measure of
the degree of preference provided domestic producers would be correct only if no tax
had been levied on these inputs. However, except for such items as automobiles, jewelry,
toilet preparations, sporting goods, refrigerators, synthetics, silk and wool fabrics, tele-
vision sets, combination radio and phonograph sets, luggage, and furniture, where the
sales tax is between 30 and 50 per cent and the markup between 50 and 100 per cent, the
exaggeration of the protective effect of the sales tax by Power is not very significant. The
sales tax for most nonluxury items is only 7 per cent; and the markup on imports, 25
per cent. Thus, for a commodity for which value added plus electricity and fuel amounts th
to 40 per cent of itstotal value, the exaggeration of the implicit import tax would
amount to only five percentage points. th
20. The 97-sector, input-output transaction table for 1965 together with tariff and th sales-tax data were kindly supplied by Tito A. Mijares, the director of the Philippine
Bureau of the Census and Statistics. qu
21. See the appendix to the chapter for the source of these data. fo
22. In 1958 and 1959 the lowest rate for imports was P2.03 to the dollar. co
23. Cited by F. H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic an
Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 151. di
24. In the case of imports, however, it is suggested by the data in Table 5-11 that
the incentive to overvalue imports as a means of shifting funds abroad was outweighed
by smuggling and by the incentive to undervalue the goods in order to reduce customs
duties. R
25. E. B. Ayal, The Philippine Cotton Textile industry (Center for Development
Planning, National Planning Association, Field Work Report 24, January 1968).
E 26. Central Bank News Digest, August 31, 1971, p. 5.
27. Itis assumed that foreign prices are the same regardless of the volume of CO
Philippine imports. th
28. For a discussion of the welfare effects of smuggling, see J. Bhagwati and B. Han-
sen, "A Theoretical Analysis of Smuggling," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1973. du!
29. Philippine Manufacturing.
30. Ibid., Table 6.2, pp. 9 1—96.
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